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OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AIRPOWER DOCTRINE
The Vietnam War is one of the most controversial events in the U.S. history. It has been extensively researched, documented, and reviewed since the wars' conclusion in 1975.
In the early to mid-sixties the global environment was confusing and dangerous. The U.S. was working to establish itself as the leader of the free capitalist world and the enemy of communism. Internally the U.S. was beginning a period of self-examination and internal challenge with the emergence of the civil rights movement and President Johnson's "Great Society."
The U.S. military was coming off a stalemate in the limited war in Korea. At the time,
we were training and organizing like the force that won World War II (WW II) against
Germany and Japan. Consequently many of its doctrinal principles, especially with respect to airpower and its application toward conflict resolution, were vestiges of WW II and the Korean War experience.
The assassination of President Kennedy catapulted Lyndon Johnson into a briar patch.
Enamored and committed to building the "Great Society," he was now burdened with the responsibilities of foreign affairs and stifling communism. Could the U.S. build a Great Society and stave off communism at the same time? While Johnson struggled to find an acceptable solution to the Vietnam War, his highest priority remained the President's domestic agenda.
Our experience in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 helped shape many of the strategic programs to contain the threat of communism and the Soviet Union. The desire to fight communism played a large part in U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia.
Throughout our involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. was indecisive about how to proceed.
Our mission and purpose for engaging the North Vietnamese were not clearly defined. There was little if any cohesion between the political objectives presented the militarily mean to achieve them. Operation ROLLING THUNDER exemplifies a micromanaged operation that ignored the capabilities, experience and doctrine of the armed services.
President Johnson was inclined to take the advice of his divided civilian advisors, rather than his military advisors. The rift between the administration and military leaders created an environment that was not conducive to establishing a dialogue to accurately access the situation in Vietnam and proceed accordingly. The administration was wedded to the idea of using airpower as part of a carrot and stick approach, inconsistent with airpower doctrine. They believed that we could use bombing raids as a show of resolve and punish the insurgents in South Vietnam. Military advisors, drawing upon history and experience, advocated stifling communism by defeating the enemy.
The Vietnamese conflict was a tumultuous time for the U.S., and for our armed services.
Operation ROLLING THUNDER taught us many valuable lessons.
The strategic fallout from the Vietnam War prevailed for years after the end of the war.
The implications for the military, specifically within the Air Force, were great. They impacted future thinking about strategic bombing doctrine, civil-military relations and bureaucratic politics.
They also affected future organization and training within the Air Force.
STRATEGIC SITUATION PRE-VIETNAM WAR

PERCEPTIONS
In the early 1960's the political situation in South Vietnam was in a state of disarray. South
Vietnamese leaders needed immediate assistance. President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in 1963, then the country went through a series of coup attempts by military leaders. This unstable political situation was accompanied by an even more ominous military situation. North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces were pouring across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to assist the indigenous insurgent, the Viet Cong (VC). The South Vietnamese Army (SVA) was becoming less effective, morale was suffering, and the enemy seemed to be getting stronger as the steady flow of men and material down the Ho Chi Minh Trail accelerated.
Henry Kissingers' statement after years as Secretary of State with the Nixon administration sums up the U.S. situation in the sixties:
We had entered the Korean War because we were afraid that to fail to do so would produce a much graver danger to Europe in the near future. But then the very reluctance to face an all-out onslaught on Europe severely circumscribed the risk we were prepared to run to prevail in Korea…Ten years later we encountered the same dilemmas in Vietnam. Once more we became involved because we considered the warfare in Indochina the manifestation of a coordinated global Communist challenge of which Indochina seemed to be a part also made Vietnam appear as unprofitable place for a showdown… Henry Kissinger
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The U.S. was global power fighting for democracy and against communism, primarily the Russians and the Chinese. In addition, the U.S. was involved in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Our global presence shaped the way that the U.S. looked at the world and would eventually shape the American view of Vietnam. This nurtured an "us versus them" or "democracy versus communism" mindset within the U.S. government. A State Department white paper reflects this attitude:
While attention is diverted elsewhere -to Berlin, to negotiations over Laos, to turmoil in the Congo, to the United Nations itself, as well as to dozens of other problems -the communist program to seize South Viet-Nam moves ahead relentlessly.
2
The magnitude of the communist challenge consumed the foreign policy of the U.S. When the situation in Vietnam escalated to include both the North Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong, that threat was viewed as part of an overall communist effort. This resulted in U.S.
commitment to preserve South Vietnam for the free non-communist world.
The U.S. did not view the situation in Vietnam as a civil war between the communist government in the north and the elected government in the south. The U.S. felt that it was fighting an overall communist scheme rather than an enemy that was embroiled in a civil war and that derived its power and passion from the will of the people. This overwhelming anticommunist opinion would play the most important factor in the perceived need of the U. Over this war-and all Asia-is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes. I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucified either way I moved. If I left the women I really loved -The Great Society -in order to get involved with that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home…But if I left that war and let Communists take over South Vietnam, then I would be seen as a coward and my nation would be seen as an appeaser and we would both find it impossible to accomplish anything for anybody on the entire globe. The second enemy or front fought were the VC forces, operating primarily at the provincial or local level. This complicated matters: Both represented a threat but had to be engaged at different locations and with appropriate forces.
Many believed that the NVA regulars were the primary force and should be neutralized prior to addressing the local guerilla threat. Westmoreland targeted the main enemy forces moving into South Vietnam and placed the majority of his forces in the southern part of the country. This concentration of forces and belief that the majority of the fighting would be in the south determined where and how Operation ROLLING THUNDER was prosecuted.
STRATEGIC BOMBING DOCTRINE (WAYS)
The political objectives pressed upon the military were stifling and inconsistent with the existing doctrine, particularly the Air Force strategic bombing doctrine. Air Force doctrine had developed from strategic bombing campaigns in WW II with Germany and Japan. The basic tenets of airpower doctrine were broken in Vietnam.
No longer was there unlimited ability to pursue the enemy and the ability to affect the will of the people by attacking vital centers of gravity. To compound matters, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) were restrictive and severely impacted mission effectiveness.
Some disagreed with the conclusions of the Strategic Bombing Survey, at least in terms of the magnitude of effect. There is not much disagreement, however, that strategic bombing did change the course of the war and in conjunction with assistance from the other services, it was instrumental in winning WW II in both the European and Pacific. The airpower doctrine and Johnson's "gradual response" policy were like oil and water.
His political objectives may have been unacceptable and unobtainable through military means.
Air Force leaders were unable to step back and modify the doctrine to develop acceptable alternatives to satisfy the political objectives they had to work with. They had no experience in working with political restraints in the bombing arena. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to succeed. The original concept of the JCS was to go into North Vietnam with a severe application of airpower. In fact our target list was 94 targets, which we intended to destroy in a total of 16 days. That process was disapproved. It was the 2 nd of March 1965, and we recommended what we called a sharp, sudden blow, which would have in our opinion done much to paralyze the enemy capability to move his equipment around and to support people in the south. That was disapproved… 8
MILITARY (MEANS)
The military task confronting us is to make it so expensive for the North Vietnamese that they will stop their aggression against South Vietnam and Laos. If we make it too expensive for them, they will stop. They don't want to lose everything they have.
Curtis LeMay, July 1965 9 General LeMay's declaration in July 1965 validates the Air Force belief in the ability of airpower and strategic bombing to destroy the enemy's will to fight. It never occurred to the Air Force leadership that bombing might not be effective within the confines of a small country such as North Vietnam whose main war effort was to support insurgency forces with men and materiel. It also never occurred to them that the industrial make-up in North Vietnam was much different than it was in Germany, or even Japan.
At the beginning of the Vietnam War, the Air Force truly believed in the mission of strategic deterrence-primarily against the communist world. Both the training and senior leadership had developed and matured during the bombing campaigns in WWII.
The Air Force believed that all future wars would be won by striking the industrial centers of the enemy to deliver irreversible destruction. This was the basic doctrine of the Air Force senior leadership. It also provided the basis for specific resources and weapon systems and the corresponding training. In Rolling Thunder; Jet Combat From WWII to the Gulf War, Ivan
Rendall perfectly summarizes the situation:
American fighter pilots had been trained to fight a different kind of war, one which did not include dog fighting with guided missiles. The USAF, born to fight the Cold War on massive scale, suddenly found itself fighting a small, intimate, close-up, counter-insurgency war with the wrong equipment and the wrong training, and being expected to do it under severe political limitations.
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The two weapon systems that were the mainstays of Operation ROLLING THUNDER were the F-105 Thunderchief and the F-4 Phantom. The F-105, more commonly known as the "Thud," was designed to fight the Cold War, primarily the Russians, by flying high-speed interdiction missions with nuclear weapons into the Soviet Union. The Thuds were being tasked to fly a different type of interdiction mission in Vietnam: they were delivering conventional "iron bombs" which required lower flight levels and therefore reduced speeds. This increased the vulnerabilities of the aircrews.
The Phantom was an incredibly durable and versatile aircraft which performed many types of missions in Vietnam. Its speed made it a much better aircraft than the F-106 Super Sable for interceptor missions. With the introduction of the RF-4C Wild Weasel, it replaced the RF-101
Voodoo as the preferred reconnaissance asset.
OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER -THE CAMPAIGN
Operation ROLLING THUNDER was the longest strategic bombing campaign in the history of the United States Air Force -lasting for three years and nine months, from March 1965 through November 1968. Each phase of the campaign and the associated debates that prefaced each phase are discussed in this section. Additionally, we will review the specific targeting and assess its contributions to the overall campaign objectives. Finally, we will discuss specific restraints and constraints and their effects on the effectiveness of airpower in Vietnam.
In Rolling Thunder; Understanding Policy and Program Failures, J.C. Thompson defends the thesis that "the agony of American involvement persisted because of the nature of the organizations within the U.S. government that dealt with questions of foreign policy."
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Thompson argues that groups will generally follow some organizational norms that result in consensus and finally determine foreign policy. These debates, issues, and actors thus frame the action and intent in the campaign phases. However, all parties agreed that military airpower would be instrumental in execution of U.S. Washington was in complete control of the missions -scheduling the dates, specific targets, type of armament, and even the type of strike (such as armed reconnaissance or interdiction or preplanned strikes). Activity and sortie rates climbed following a conference in Honolulu with
McNamara and his military leadership, who continued to push for an intensified campaign.
Johnson had from the beginning looked at Operation ROLLING THUNDER as a "carrot and stick" operation, one that offered domestic assistance or negotiation for reduced support of the insurgent forces as the carrot. Of course, bombs were considered the sticks; they were used to show resolve and to punish those assisting the insurgency in South Vietnam. Although the sortie rate climbed during this phase, the troubling target selection process had been established and continued during the famous "Tuesday Lunch" sessions at the White House.
Not only was the targeting process inefficient, it also severely limited the effects of airpower.
Both Hanoi and Haiphong were spared by prohibitively restrictive zones that buffered the cities.
Airfields were off limits, as were many industrial plants as well as targets that were within the China buffer zone. Interdiction efforts were for the most part unsuccessful: the road systems were quickly repaired by bicycle brigades, and damaged bridges were bypassed or placed just under the water level and thus hard to detect. The VC were not receiving as much support from
Hanoi as had been anticipated; they were living off of the villages as they moved around South
Vietnam. Although airpower was hitting intended targets, the limits on lucrative targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, along with lack of a constant and intense effort, hindered interdiction. Likewise, bombing halts and bad weather hindered the effort to stop the infiltration of North Vietnamese soldiers into South Vietnam. Estimates varied:
The CIA and DIA, in their December 1965 "Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam, reported that despite 55,000 sorties and the dropping of 33,000 tons of bombs, damage has neither stopped nor curtailed movement of military supplies and created no evidence of serious problems due to shortages of equipment.
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The second phase of the campaign was the shortest, carried out during several months in the summer of 1966. The primary targets during this phase were the Petroleum, Oil, and Lubrication (POL) facilities in North Vietnam. Despite the destruction of 60% of its storage facilities, the North Vietnamese had dispersed POL drums throughout the countryside, enabling them to continue the push south with little delay. By August most POL targets had been hit, but the ability to sustain military operations seemed to be unaffected. As POL targets were struck in Vietnam, the debate in Washington between the "hawks" and "doves" raged.
General McConnell continued his push to intensify the campaign, and most of the NSC remained committed to the current bombing campaign (except for George Ball). McNamara, however, was starting to have doubts and ordered a study by the Institute for Defense Analysis. Not every war need be fought until one side collapse. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. If from the very start the other side feels that this is probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take the long way round and totally defeat the enemy. Along with the counter-air campaign, interdiction of the major LOC's (lines of communication) in the northern routes also had been effective. All the main bridges were down, and most of the marshalling yards were blocked. A single throughline was kept open at great expensive in repair crews."
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But numbers tell another story, even though airpower advocates saw successes:
Rolling Thunder had involved 300,000 aircraft sorties to drop 600,000 tons of bombs at a cost 382 aircrew know to have been killed and another 702 missing in action. The United States lost 392 aircraft in 1968, 257 to ground fire, at a cost $450 million in that year alone. The total number of combat aircraft lost was 900.
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Further evidence shows that Operation ROLLING THUNDER failed to meet its objectives.
There certainly were some serious strategy failures in terms of matching an appropriate military means to the overall political strategy in Vietnam. Obviously, the U.S. underestimated the will of the North Vietnamese people. Regardless of whether the political objectives of the Johnson administration were appropriate, in a democracy politicians determine the why and what of conflict. However, it is usually up to the military to determine the specific means. In the end, the success or failure of the politicians' plans will be determined by the effectiveness of the military.
The next section of this SRP will apply military Principles of War to the conduct of Operation ROLLING THUNDER.
MILTIARY PRINCIPLES OF WAR
OBJECTIVE
The most critical Principle of War is the Objective; it sets the stage for the other aspects of war and determines the remaining principles. Unfortunately, the U.S. failed miserably in the achievement of the objective both in the overall Vietnam War effort and in Operation ROLLING THUNDER. Consider the objective that General Eisenhower issued to his subordinate commanders just prior to initiating Operation Overlord in 1944: "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." 17 Eisenhower's objective was clear and understandable at all levels; it specified a positive and definite end state, one that would remain consistent both politically and militarily through the push to Berlin. Unlike Eisenhower in WW II, Johnson created objectives for the U.S., which were seen to be politically and diplomatically feasible, but were confusing and unobtainable at the operational level. Pushed into a decision by world perceptions, coupled with a fear of communism and a lack of understanding of the type of conflict and the will of the people of North Vietnam, U.S. political objectives were not well framed. Consequently, "the political object -the original motive for the war -will determine both military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."
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The U.S. government was more concerned with stopping the spread of communism and supporting the government of South Vietnam than with defeating an enemy or winning a war.
Johnson's "negative objectives" would be thrust upon the military and would greatly affect airpowers' capability and results of airpower.
Conversely, as the U.S. struggled to set realistic and obtainable objectives, the North Enemy strategy can be outlined quickly, since it was simple, concise, and consistent…the opposition knew what they wanted to do, they had the initiative, and they had the winning combination…Controlling and communizing all of Indochina have always been the foe's overriding objectives
19
OFFENSIVE
The failure to determine a single and clear objective for Vietnam would lead to a passive strategic policy, which would limit how the U.S. would fight the war. That policy would result in the U.S. fighting a passive war with instruments of military power designed for offensive action.
As we noted earlier, the military advisors continually pushed for the escalation of bombing and 
MASS/ECONOMY OF FORCE/MANEUVER
Mass, Economy of Force, and Maneuver were all principles that the Air Force demonstrated with some degree of success during the air campaign. All of these principles are systematic to airpower, and the Air Force was able to observe these principles despite the restraints they operated under. The principle of Mass enables an armed force to achieve decisive results at a specific time and place. This was exactly what General LeMay and his air staff planners had in mind during the summer of 1964. Mass determined the 94-target plan that was submitted to the JCS and McNamara; it was specifically designed to destroy the warmaking elements of the North Vietnamese government. Through an intense, concentrated application of air power, they estimated American and South Vietnamese forces could destroy all targets in sixteen days.
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The principles of Economy of Force and Maneuver were also adhered to in Operation ROLLING THUNDER. Earl Tilford describes the effort:
A typical strike package consisted of several diverse elements complied to accomplish the two objectives of getting the fighter-bombers to their targets and then getting them home safe. 
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Critics point out that although these strike packages were efficient in terms of the numbers of sorties, they were less than effective in their application of Mass due to the predictability and timing of the strikes. While the U.S. effort was suffering from a serious lack of unity of command, the North Vietnamese were totally focused on the war effort. Many of their military commanders were also involved in setting the political direction for the war: for example, General Vo Nguyen Giap was both the military commander and a member of the Politburo.
UNITY OF COMMAND/SIMPLICITY
SECURITY/SURPRISE
The final two Principles of War are Security and Surprise. These two principles are frequently associated with many of the previous principles such as Mass, Maneuver, Economy of Force, and Unity of Command. They may be critical elements in the accomplishment of these principles, especially at the tactical level. Operation ROLLING THUNDER suffered under many restrictions especially the ROE's, that it became almost impossible to achieve these principles.
For example, because of the sortie-generation approach to scheduling, the Air Force would plan and fly missions at certain times with certain numbers in order to demonstrate participation. This is similar to the Army's "body counts," which were used to determine success or failures, thus overlooking mission effectiveness. This process became so routine that the term "Dr.
Pepper War" was soon coined. The term was used because the television advertisement stated that the best times to have a soda are, "10, 2, and 4." In addition to knowing when the air strikes were coming, all of North Vietnam was divided into flight sectors Each one of the sectors had specific boundaries; more importantly, there were specific entry and exit lanes in each sector. The North Vietnamese installed the vast majority of their enemy defenses, such as anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles sites, within these areas in order to take advantage of these lanes. Air Force planes and crews were thus programmed into "sitting ducks." Vietnamese government to stop insurgencies, and to raise the morale in support of the government in Saigon were all political in purpose. They provided the ends by which the administration felt that they could fulfill their global role without initiating further conflict with the Russian and the Chinese. This fear of escalation determined the political objectives and led to a "graduated response" of military actions, designed to punish insurgents, with the conviction that they would eventually understand the intent of U.S. policy and move out of South Vietnam.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Operation ROLLING THUNDER was viewed as a way to execute this policy. However, political and doctrinal limitations would hamper the ability of airpower to accomplish the objectives.
Johnson's civilian advisors did not understood the offensive capabilities of airpower, and they failed to also appreciate its liabilities as a defensive instrument constrained in its operations.
Although Operation ROLLING THUNDER would suffer from limitations such as the targeting process, bombing restrictions and ROE's, senior Air Force leaders were unable to evaluate the situation, change tactics, and effectively communicate their rationale through the civilian chain of command. The Air Force would continue to operate in Operation ROLLING THUNDER and throughout the remainder of the air war under a bombing doctrine that was derived from its WW II lessons and successes. This bombing doctrine was based on successful bombing of the industrialized nation of Germany and the comparable effects that bombing had on Japan in the Pacific theater. Additionally, senior leaders in both the Air Force and the JCS were unable to effectively assess the situation and offer viable military alternatives that might have been more appropriate to the political ends of the Johnson administration. Continued insistence on accelerated bombing would not only fail to achieve the political objectives, right or wrong, but would eventually alienate the civilian staff, resulting in the loss of confidence in the military leaders and their policy. Operation ROLLING THUNDER was also unsuccessful in effectively observing most of the Principles of War. Regardless of the inappropriate objectives that the military leadership was given, they were less effective because of their lack of adherence to the Principles of War. Their lack of a clear military objective, their inability to act offensively, their confusing and ineffective organizational structure, and their inability to surprise and devastate the enemy all greatly contributed to the administration's view of the campaign.
If it is true that all wars are political in nature, then it must also be true that the ability of the military to successfully communicate and give its advice to the civilian leadership will be critical to future conflicts. We owe it to the American people to pass on what we have learned through our years of experience as military professionals to our designated policy makers and to ensure that those experiences are never forgotten. Airpower is not the answer for all situations.
It must be applied properly, taking advantage of the inherent strengths and capabilities that it can bring to the fight. However, we must never forget that "flexibility is the key to airpower." We will certainly be called upon in the future.
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